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Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts:
An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.*
Guido Calabresit
In 1960 1 walked into an office at The University of Chicago Law
School. There Ifound Walter Blum and Harry Kalven. They had just
read a draft of what was to become my first article. Harry greeted me
with: "it's all wrong . . . but I wish I had written an article like that
when I was your age!" This began the debate. Blum and Kalven
delivered the Shulman Lectures at Yale, Public Law Perspectives on
a Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation Plans; I struck back in
Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven; but
they had the last laugh in The Empty Cabinet of Doctor Calabresi. I
believe that the law of torts benefited from that hard fought polemic.
I know that I, as a young scholar, could not have had a tougher, or
more loving, initiation to scholarship. Fifteen years have passed and
Harry is no more. Because I think that he would disagree with this
paper as much as he did with my first, I gratefully dedicate it to his
memory. **
Sooner or later most commentators in the field of torts find it
necessary to deal explicitly with the problem of causation. Indeed,
so much has been written about the significance of a causal require-
ment in torts, on both a philosophical and a hornbook level, that
another essay may seem superfluous. At this point, a digest, criti-
cism, or even analysis of those previous writings would not be espe-
cially useful.' Moreover, the philosophical significance of the con-
* This article is derived from the Harris Lectures, given at the University of Indiana
School of Law (Bloomington) in October 1974. The lectures will be published in full, in book
form.
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
** W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM-AUTO
COMPENSATION PLANS (1965); Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 641 (1964); Calabresi, Fault, Acci-
dents, and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965); Blum &
Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34
U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (1967).
1 The influence of many of these writings on my thought should be readily apparent. This
paper is not the place to attempt a bibliography of even the major works on causation and
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cept of causation is something that I am neither inclined nor
trained to discuss. Yet, for all of that, one facet of the relationship
of causation to tort law does deserve exploration.
In recent years, tort law has been reexamined with certain ends
or functions consciously. in mind. Commentators have asked how
the law of torts determines what injuries are worth avoiding, how it
controls what categories of people bear the burden of those injuries
that do occur and the related burden of avoiding those injuries
deemed worth avoiding, and how it serves to encourage or require
the spreading of such burdens. Finally, commentators have consid-
ered how these goals relate to the concept and language of jus-
tice-the test, however vague and uncertain, by which any area of
law must be judged.2
This functional approach has come to dominate American tort
scholarship. Even its severe critics begin with this framework in
order to point out the limitations they perceive in it. Yet those,
myself included, who have been the most assiduous in furthering
this approach have not explicitly considered the role causation
should play when tort law is examined in terms of deterrence,
spreading, and distributional goals. What significance does the re-
quirement of causation have for those ends? Can causation serve
such goals, or is it, as some have regarded the fault principle, an
impediment to their achievement? Would an explicit analysis of
causation in the light of such goals help explain those cases that
have seemed paradoxical under traditional analysis? These ques-
tions, along with the closely related question of what role causal
language should play in a tort system eschewing the fault principle,
deserve consideration.
All of these questions cannot be explored in this short paper.3
My more modest task here will be to analyze causation in terms of
torts. I would, however, single out for particular mention Leon Green, H.L.A. Hart and A.M.
Honor6, Fleming James, Robert Keeton, and Wex Malone, because their works were espe-
cially significant in the development of my ideas on the subject.
2 See, e.g., W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIvATE LAW PROBLEM
(1965); G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970);
Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Calabresi & Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability and Inalienability, 85 HARM. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Posner, Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 205 (1973); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES
29 (1972); cf. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUDIES 391 (1975); Epstein, Defenses
and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 165 (1974); Epstein,
A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 151 (1973); Epstein, Pleadings and
Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 556 (1973); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
These questions will, however, be considered at length in the book of which this article
is only a psirt.
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deterrence, spreading, and distributional goals and then to apply
my observations to a few classic causation cases. Throughout this
enterprise only the functions of causal language will be considered;
deeper questions about the meaning of cause cannot and will not be
discussed. Accordingly, the definitionsof cause used in this paper
will not even begin to cover the field. Instead, they will be pedes-
trian definitions designed to do no more than further analysis of the
question I have posed: what role does causal language play in the
achievement of certain goals that have come to be accepted as cru-
cial to the law of torts?
To accomplish this function-oriented task it is useful to distin-
guish three concepts of "cause": "causal link," "but for cause," and
''proximate cause."
The first concept, as I shall use it, is entirely predictive and
empirical. There is a causal link between an act or activity and an
injury when we conclude on the basis of the available evidence that
the recurrence of that act or activity will increase the chances that
the injury will also occur. There is a causal link between the failure
to keep a light on at the top of a flight of stairs and a person falling
down those stairs, whether or not a particular fall was in some other
sense caused by the failure of lighting. Mr. Chief Justice Burger's
bicycle riding and drag-racing on Washington streets by teenagers
are both causally linked to the accident the Chief Justice had. This
is true regardless of the value society places on either riding bicycles
or drag-racing on the public streets. It would remain true even if it
could be shown that the particular injuries would have occurred
even if the Chief Justice had been walking or even if there had been
no drag-racers on the particular occasion. The point is that we be-
lieve that bicycle riding and drag-racing will increase the likelihood
that such an accident will occur in the future even if on this specific
occasion they played no role.4
Obviously there are an infinite number of acts or activities that
are causally linked to every injury. Some may be viewed as socially
desirable, some as neutral, and some as undesirable or even despica-
ble. Getting up in the morning and going out increases the chances
of many injuries-some of which are bound to occur. So does driving
or practicing medicine. Driving or practicing medicine without a
license increases the chances of injuries still more. It may be that
I use the term "causal linkage" to describe situations where we believe that the occur-
rence of activity A will increase the chances of injury B. I do not mean by this to make any
claims as to the existence of causal connections as they are sometimes described in philosoph-
ical writings.
1975]
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we believe that these unlicensed activities increase only the chances
of injuries due to negligent driver or doctor behavior, but it may also
be that we believe they increase the chances of injuries in which no
negligence can be found. In the first case, the activities are causally
linked only to negligent harms; in the second, they are causally
linked to a broader category of injuries, the incidence of which will
increase whether or not negligent behavior occurs.5 In sum, the con-
cept of causal linkage between acts and activities and injuries is no
more than an expression of empirically based belief that the act or
activity in question will, if repeated in the future, increase the likeli-
hood that the injury under consideration will also occur.
The second concept of cause is the familiar one of but for or sine
qua non cause. A but for cause, as I shall use it, is any one of many
acts or activities without which a particular injury would not have
occurred. This usage is common enough and needs no special discus-
sion. The only point worth making at this stage is that, while there
is frequently an overlap between causal linkage and but for cause,
the two concepts often'diverge. The death of a person found with a
broken neck at the foot of an unlighted staircase is causally linked
to the absence of light even though it may be conclusively proved
that the particular victim fell on the particular occasion because of
a sudden dizzy spell that would have occurred with or without ade-
quate lighting, that is, was not related in a but for sense to the
absence of light. Conversely, but for the fact that the trolley driver
had been speeding, the trolley car would not have been under a
particular rotten tree when it fell and hit the car. Yet, unless speed-
ing increases vibrations and vibrations increase the likelihood of
trees falling, the admittedly but for cause would not be causally
linked to the injury. a
The final concept I shall consider is that of proximate cause.
This concept, again familiar enough, will be used in a largely con-
clusory sense. It will embrace those presumably causally linked,
usually (but by no means always) but for causes to which, in the
absence of certain specified defenses, a particular legal -system
wishes to assign at least partial responsibility for an accident. Such
a conclusory "definition" will obviously necessitate a discussion of
what additional requirements, if any, must be met, under our cur-
rent legal system and under each of the tort goals mentioned above,
in order to conclude that an action is a proximate cause.
5 See, e.g., Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926); cf. Ross v. Hartman, 139
F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944).
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Why should tort law be concerned with causation in any of the
three above senses of the word? To answer this question it is neces-
sary to return to the goals or functions of torts I have discussed in
earlier work and to ask how, if at all, causal linkage, but for cause,
or the extra "something" that in practice is added by the require-
ment of "proximity" in cause may further those goals. As I have
defined them elsewhere,6 there are four such goals, two "compensa-
tion goals"-spreading and distributional equity-and two "deter-
rence goals"-specific or collective deterrence and general or market
deterrence. In this paper I shall not attempt to reproduce those
earlier definitions, but shall, instead, briefly explain what I mean
by them as each one is examined in relation to the three concepts
of causation outlined above.
I. THE REQUIREMENT OF CAUSATION IN TORTS: CAUSE AS A
FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT
A. Compensation Goals
Tort compensation goals may be described in rough terms as
follows: since people not only value a lump sum of money differ-
ently, but place a different value on each subsequent dollar as well,
the total impact of an injury may be diminished by an appropriate
allocation of its burden. If, in general, a large lump sum burden is
more onerous when borne by one person than it would be if divided
among many, then one function of tort law may be to ensure that,
consistent with other goals, injury burdens are spread. Moreover, if
even heavy burdens are less onerous when borne by certain wealth
categories rather than others, then another function of tort law,
again consistent with other goals, may be to allocate injury burdens
to those wealth categories able to bear them with relative ease. It is
not necessary to consider here whether these are worthy goals; it is
enough to note that they have played a significant role in tort law.
For their significance, in itself, justifies asking the question: what
role do the three concepts of causation have in furthering these
goals?
1. Spreading. If spreading of injury losses were the only goal
of tort law, there would be no point at all in requiring, as a prere-
quisite to liability, a causal link between an act or activity and the
injury. The fact that some acts or activities increase the chances
that an injury will occur in the future, while others do not, indicates
a G. CALABRESI, supra note 2.
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nothing about the ability of either injurer or victim to spread injury
costs that have occurred. A prediction of the likelihood of future
accidents resulting from particular behavior has no relation to abil-
ity to spread past injury costs. Hence, causal link between an action
and an injury would be irrelevant to liability.
Of course, one could ask a different kind of causal link question,
such as whether placing the loss on a particular actor would increase
the chances that he would be able to spread similar losses occur-
ring in the future. This kind of causal linkage would be fundamen-
tal to allocating losses so as to achieve spreading, but it has nothing
to do with causation as it has been used in tort law.
All this is essentially tautological. Spreading is concerned with
lessening the burdens of losses that have already occurred. Causal
linkage, in its normal sense, refers to the likelihood that some be-
havior will result in loss in the future. Hence, causal linkage is
irrelevant to the spreading function of tort law.
The same is true of the requirement of a but for relationship
between an act or activity and the injury. The fact that some behav-
ior was or was not a but for cause of an injury says nothing about
the ability of those who engaged in that behavior to lessen the im-
pact of the injury by spreading its burdens. Thus, any requirement
that responsibility be accompanied by a but for link, just like any
requirement that it be accompanied by a causal link, must find its
justification in tort functions other than the spreading of injury
losses.
If spreading were the only goal of tort law, a social insurance
fund, raised through taxes assessed on a per capita basis, would be
the optimal mechanism for achieving it. Such a compensation sys-
tem, designed to spread all accident losses to the maximum degree
possible, would not ask causal questions. Because ability to spread
depends on factors completely separate from linkage to a particular
accident (but for cause) or predictions of what future behavior is
dangerous (causal link), this system would require neither causal
link nor a but for relationship as a prerequisite to assessing the taxes
used to compensate accident losses.
The requirement of proximity, however, may have some role to
play in regard to spreading aims. If spreading were the only goal,
there would be no need for a causal link or but for relationship; it
would follow that there would also be no need for whatever addi-
tional limitations are imposed by the requirement of proximity. But
if other tort goals, yet to be discussed, make the requirements of
causal link or but for relationship desirable, then the additional
requirement of proximity might be used to pick relatively good
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"spreaders" from among those potentially liable actors who were, in
a causal link and but for sense, "causes" of the harm.
To determine whether in practice the proximate cause require-
ment serves some spreading aims, it is necessary to look to the
content of the term "proximate" as it is used by the courts and then
to consider whether the requirement as thus applied helps to distin-
guish relatively good spreaders from poor ones. To the extent that
such an exercise involves case analysis it will be dealt with below.'
Some aspects of the requirement of proximity which clearly bear on
the selection of good spreaders out of a mass of potentially responsi-
ble parties may, however, be briefly suggested here.
Some elements in proximate cause, like the requirement of fore-
seeability (in whatever form it takes and to whatever extent it is,
in fact, deemed essential), are clearly germane to ability to spread
losses. Though some commentators have argued that people, in
practice, are apt to insure even against some harms they cannot
foresee,8 that argument is based on the vagaries of insurance com-
pany practices and presupposes that, apart from such practices,
where a loss is not foreseeable, the chances that someone would
insure against it are substantially less. Since spreading ability is
thus crucially linked to insurance coverage, it is not hard to see how
foresight, as an element in proximate cause, is itself linked to
spreading ability.
Similarly, that aspect of proximate cause concerned with the
"size and nature of the damages" is closely linked to the ability of
the potentially liable party to "self-insure" (that is, either to set
aside a contingency fund or to cover the losses out of ordinary in-
come) in order to avoid being bankrupt by a large liability. It does
not matter whether size and nature of damages are explicitly recog-
nized as part of the concept of proximate cause. All that matters is
whether, in practice, findings of proximate cause turn or appear to
turn on the size of the damages and the ability of the defendant to
bear them and still keep going. To the extent that they do, proxi-
mate cause furthers the goal of spreading.
Finally, the proximate cause requirement may also reflect
spreading aims when it gives juries, instead of courts, the power to
assess responsibility. If in determining who shall bear the loss juries
are in practice more affected by ability to spread than are courts,
then the requirement of proximity, by its very effect on who decides
See text and notes at note 55 infra.
See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
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responsibility, may serve to select good spreaders from poor ones.
Again, one should recognize that the concept of proximate
cause may at most serve as a limit, a device for selecting the best
spreader out of a group of potentially liable actors who were origi-
nally identified on the basis of causation principles irrelevant to
spreading. Proximate cause cannot be used to impose liability on a
non-causally linked, non-but for cause that would be a highly effec-
tive spreader instead of on a less efficient spreader that is a causally
linked, but for cause. By imposing some limits, the requirement of
proximity may serve to introduce the goal of spreading into the
causal determination; the requirement cannot, however, explain
why causation should be an essential element of liability in tort. To
repeat, a system of accident law designed with nothing but
spreading in mind would be a social insurance system funded by
general taxes; such a system would necessarily do away with any
requirement of causation, including that of proximity. Thus, to find
a justification for requirements of causation in torts, it is necessary
to look beyond spreading goals.
2. Wealth Distribution or "Deep Pocket." For much the same
reasons that spreading functions do not help explain the require-
ment of causation in torts, distributional goals also fail as
explanatory principles. Again, causal linkage is not helpful in select-
ing from among potentially liable parties those who, if burdened,
would better serve wealth distribution functions. The fact that cer-
tain activities increase the danger of future accidents says nothing
about the relative wealth of the parties involved. The same is, of
course, true of but for relationships. A but for cause of an injury is
no more and no less likely to come from a wealthy category of injurer
than a non-but for cause. Hence, the but for relationship is also
irrelevant to wealth distribution goals.
Again, it is possible to redefine causal linkage and but for rela-
tionships so that they run, not from "action" to "injury," but from
wealth, status, caste or even generalized merit (so long as "merit"
is not defined in terms of accident avoidance9) to injury. Causal
requirements could be shaped as follows: "in order to impose liabil-
ity we must be able to say that, but for his wealth the injury would
not have occurred" or "we require that his wealth increase the
I To the extent that accident avoidance is the basis of merit judgments and that these
judgments in turn become the basis of distributional judgments, causal link and but for cause
may, indeed, be relevant. But then the goal, in my terminology, is not a distributional one.
Because its effect is to reward and punish for the purpose of diminishing accidents, it is,
instead, a deterrence goal.
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chances of his engaging in activities that in turn increase the proba-
bility of future occurrences of this injury." Such a "but for" or
"causal link" requirement would, of course, serve distributional
goals just as its analogue, requiring a but for relationship or a causal
link to spreading ability, would further spreading goals. But, as
noted above, tort law has never been concerned with these types of
causal relationships. Rather, the but for relationships and causal
links that have been at the core of tort cases are in themselves
neutral insofar as spreading or wealth distribution are concerned.
The role of the proximity requirement is more ambiguous. Here
too, since it serves only as a limitation, a device for selecting among
potentially responsible parties, it cannot be used to pick out that
party who, in distributive terms, is best suited to bear the burden.
It may be used, however, to select a relatively good loss bearer in
terms of wealth distribution goals from among a group of parties
who are deemed potentially liable in terms of other tort goals.
It is more difficult to be sure of this role for the proximate cause
requirement with respect to distributional goals than it was with
respect to spreading, because some aspects of proximity (like fore-
sight) relate directly to spreading capacity, while none go directly
to distributional capacity. Still, it may well be that distributional
considerations are implicit in how juries, and perhaps even courts,
apply the test of proximity. In any event, there are enough indica-
tions that this may be the case"0 to suggest that, as with spreading,
distributional goals may be furthered by the proximate cause re-
quirement. Though again, as with spreading, if wealth distribution
were the sole aim of tort law, such a requirement would be pointless.
B. Deterrence Goals
Deterrence goals in tort law may be described as those which
seek to minimize the sum of injury costs and safety costs. These
goals are to be achieved not by mitigating the burden of costs that
have already occurred, but by creating incentives so that people will
avoid those future injuries worth avoiding and thus achieve an opti-
mal trade-off between safety and injury in a world where safety is
not a free good, and hence injury is not a total bad.1' The object of
11 See, e.g., Kinderavich v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940). See also Tedla v.
Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939). In both these cases the courts' failure to find
proximate cause as a matter of law is difficult to understand. One cannot conceive of the
courts reaching the same results if the parties' relative financial positions had been reversed.
" What the optimal trade-off will be, of course, depends on what value is put on both
injury and safety costs. Very different values may be placed on these factors, depending on
1975]
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the following analysis is to examine the role that causal require-
ments play in achieving this trade-off and specifically to ask which
requirements further which deterrence goals.
1. Collective or Specific Deterrence. One way of achieving the
appropriate trade-off between safety and injury costs is through
collective determinations of what acts or activities are too dangerous
to be permitted. I have called this approach "collective" or "specific
deterrence." In its pure form it involves a judgment by society that
certain acts or activities are undesirable and are not to be tolerated
regardless of individual desire to engage in them. In practice the
high costs of enforcement may make total eradication of the disfa-
vored behavior impossible. But whatever the cost limitations, the
basic judgment remains the collective one to forbid the behavior.
If collective deterrence were the only goal of tort law, the re-
quirement of causal linkage would play a crucial role. Society pre-
sumably decides to forbid or otherwise restrict certain behavior be-
cause it believes that such behavior is likely to increase the occur-
rence of injuries. The safety costs, that is, the burden imposed on
those who must alter their behavior in order to diminish this risk,
are deemed small enough to be worth imposing. The judgment in-
volved in choosing to forbid or restrict particular behavior is pre-
cisely the kind of judgment that depends on the existence of a causal
link, for there is no reason to prohibit or restrict behavior that we
do not believe will increase the chances of injury in the future. Such
behavior is, by definition, harmless to the best of our knowledge;
since some people desire to engage in it, there is no reason why it
should be barred. 2
Obviously, not all behavior that is causally linked to harm is
worth deterring collectively. Most behavior is risky and increases
the chances of injury-that is why a trade-off between safety and
injury costs is needed. Causal linkage to injury says nothing about
the terms of the trade-off; it only defines those situations in which
the nature of the decisional mechanism chosen, whether it be a collective political process, a
market process, or some combination of the two. A discussion of the choice of mechanism or
even of the relationship between that choice and distributional goals is beyond the scope of
this paper.
12 Injury or harm cannot, of course, be limited to physical or economic damages. Behavior
may be forbidden (whether wisely or not) because some people are "shocked" by it. Being
shocked is being harmed and the "shocking" behavior is causally linked to the harm. I have
elsewhere termed such harms "moralisms," see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2. The
statement in the text takes no position on the appropriateness of restricting behavior that
only offends. It simply states that behavior that is causally linked neither to offense nor to
other injuries is, by definition, considered innocuous.
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a trade-off may be needed. As such, the fact that an activity is
causally linked1 3 to an injury is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the imposition of collective deterrence restrictions.
Therefore, to define the prerequisites of liability under a collective
deterrence standard it is necessary to look to other causation re-
quirements.
In general, the requirement of a but for relationship between an
action and an injury provides no guidance in selecting from among
a universe of causally linked acts those which should be collectively
deterred. If specific deterrence were the only goal of tort law, collec-
tively proscribed behavior would be penalized regardless of whether
in a specific instance it was a but for cause of harm. If drunken
driving were forbidden because of its accident-causing potential, the
drunken driver would be penalized whether he had been caught as
a result of chance, of an accident, or of some other attention-getting
behavior. Moreover, even if the driver were caught because he had
been involved in an accident, a penalty would be imposed without
reference to the specific cause of the accident; it would be irrelevant
whether it was, in a but for sense, due to his drunken driving or
whether it would have occurred even if he had been as sober as a
law professor. The harm that seems likely to flow from drunken
driving (the causal link) would support the penalty quite apart from
any connection between the proscribed behavior and the specific
accident that brought the behavior to our attention.
The requirement of a but for relationship might, however, fur-
ther the goal of specific deterrence in those instances involving be-
havior collectively deemed worth proscribing only if the actor has a
certain mental attitude, such as intent to injure or to risk injury.
Distinguishing certain categories of behavior by the intent involved
creates the difficult problem of determining when behavior, in itself
permissible, bespeaks the intent that justifies the collective prohi-
bition. Since intent to injure or to risk injury is not easily estab-
lished, various surrogates (such as the "successful" completion of
the injury) are used. It could be said that, while it is impossible to
know that someone actually intended harm merely from the at-
tempt, the inference of intent is sufficiently strong if he completed
his attempt and injured someone. This line of reasoning, which is
sometimes used to justify the imposition of different penalties for
"attempted" and "completed" crimes, can also serve to explain
some applications of a but for test in a world of pure collective de-
ll Remember that causal link, as I have defined it, implies belief-not certainty.
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terrence. For example, the collective judgment may be that only
intentionally dangerous drunken driving must be forbidden; in that
case "intentionally dangerous" could be defined as that drunken
driving that results in an accident. Under such circumstances, if the
injury would have occurred even without drunken driving, collec-
tive deterrence penalties might not be imposed on the drunken
driver.
Even if the theories on which it depends are valid, such limited
relevance would hardly explain the significance that but for causa-
tion has traditionally enjoyed in tort law. Moreover, even when
applicable it would require a but for relationship only to the occur-
rence of an accident involving harm and not to the injuries produced
by that accident. Proof of the intent necessary to proscribe the
behavior would be provided simply by the occurrence of a harmful
accident. The extent of the damages resulting from the accident
would be irrelevant to the imposition of the collective deterrence
sanction, unless the extent of the injury grew step-by-step as a
function of the intent required to justify the sanctions. Apart from
such rather bizarre situations in which the existence of the disfa-
vored behavior could be determined only by looking at the precise
degree of harm that occurred in a particular case, the but for test
(as it is applied in tort law-that is, to damages, as well as to the
accident itself) would seem to serve no function for collective deter-
rence purposes.
The general lack of relevance of a but for relationship to collec-
tive deterrence does not mean, however, that the requirement that
the penalties assessed be related to foreseeable harm is also irrele-
vant. Although the notion, articulated in The Wagon Mound, 4 that
the size of the penalty should depend on the size of the foreseeable
future harm is occasionally confused with but for requirements, they
are totally separate concepts. There need not be a but for relation-
ship between penalized behavior and the injuries that in fact occur.
Rather, the size of the penalty collectively deemed appropriate
should be based on a notion of causal linkage refined to reflect the
extent of those injuries that we believe may well be increased by the
behavior to be sanctioned. Such a causal linkage requirement may
or may not be appropriate to the kind of collective deterrence de-
sired. It is enough now to note that The Wagon Mound, precisely
because its reasoning sounds in collective deterrence, would, if car-
ried to its logical end, do away with but for requirements. Wrongful
behavior (defined in terms of its foreseeable propensity for harm)
"1 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co. (The Wagon Mound),
[1961] A.C. 388 (N.S.W.); see note 32 infra for a description of the case.
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would be subject to penalties based on that propensity for harm,
regardless of whether more or less harm than that foreseen actually
came to pass-that is, regardless of but for relationships.
The requirement of proximity in causal relationships, unlike
that of but for relationships, may help to select from the universe
of causally linked actions those actions worth deterring collectively.
It may do so in two ways.
First, the element of foreseeability in the requirement of proxi-
mate cause is directly relevant to collective deterrence. What, one
may ask, is the use of trying to penalize or deter collectively those
acts or activities whose propensity for harm cannot be known at the
time the action takes place? After the accident a causal link may
be recognized, because we now know that such acts or activities are
dangerous, but why should that be a basis for penalizing actors who
neither knew nor should have known of that risk before the acci-
dent? Such penalties cannot alter dangerous behavior. Thus, in
terms of collective deterrence the argument for a foreseeability re-
quirement excluding many causally linked actions from liability is
very strong. 5
The argument for foreseeability does not, however, require that
the collective decision makers be able, before the accident, to define
those actions that are foreseeably dangerous. Collective deterrence
is as appropriate when the actors themselves should have foreseen
the danger in time to control their behavior as when the collective
decision makers prohibit it. Thus, open-ended categories of behav-
ior, filled in after the action takes place, may be prohibited or penal-
ized if it can be established at that time that the action was, in fact,
dangerous and that the actor should have foreseen the danger before
acting. Again, the actual occurrence, in a but for sense, of harmful
injury would not be logically relevant although it might call the
situation to our attention and thereby trigger the collective penal-
ties.
Second, the requirement of proximity may be useful in deciding
which causally linked activities should be selected for control out of
the infinite number of possibilities, because proximate cause im-
plies some look at the relative susceptibility of various actions to
modifications diminishing their riskiness. It is true, as all first year
torts students learn, that the requirement of proximate cause does
not mean that only one among many causes must be determined to
11 The analogous argument is much more tenuous if the goal is market deterrence. See
p. 88 infra.
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be proximate."6 Yet the more subtle student also learns that whether
a causally linked party is held responsible as a proximate cause
depends, in part, on what other parties were involved and how risky
their behavior was in comparison to his.
If the goal of collective deterrence is to select from activities
that increase the risk of injury those worth controlling (in other
words, if causal linkage suggests the need for a trade-off between
injury and safety costs), then the requirement of proximity may
serve a useful function by excluding from control some relatively
less risky actions. One element in the trade-off between safety and
injury costs in any particular activity is bound to be whether con-
trolling or modifying another activity would be more efficient. The
relational aspect in proximate cause seems to look to precisely that
issue.'
This discussion of proximate cause as a device for selecting
relatively good avoiders of accident costs for collective deterrence
purposes may strike the reader as somewhat peculiar. After all, is
that not, at least in part, what fault is about? Is fault not designed
to select from an infinity of causally linked actions those which are
by definition not worth doing, that is, wrongful or tortious? Is the
balance between safety and injury that the existence of a causal link
requires us to strike not the very same balance that sophisticated
definers of fault from Terry and Learned Hand through Richard
Posner say fault achieves?'8 The answer would seem, inescapably,
to be "yes." And, indeed, if collective deterrence were the sole goal
of tort law, it would be logical to reshape the definition of fault to
" This limitation on the extent to which the requirement of proximity selects from
causally linked parties has sound bases linked to avoidance of administrative costs.
'7 This is not to say, however, that collective deterrence of only one activity is desirable.
Considering which type of risky behavior should be forbidden does not mean that only one
kind of risk-bearing behavior should be controlled for each injury. A class of injury may be
best avoided by controlling several activities that are causally linked to the injury.
11 Terry defined fault as conduct involving unreasonably great risk and isolated five
factors (magnitude, principal object, collateral object, utility, and necessity of the risk) that
could be used in determining whether a particular risk was so great as to be "unreasonable."
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1915). Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), proposed a formula for achieving the same result:
the risk is unreasonable when the probability of harm (P) times the gravity of the injury
that would result if the event did occur (L) is less than the burden of taking adequate
precautions (B). He noted that, though the formula might suggest precision, its terms were
in fact incapable of quantification. In Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 29
(1972), Richard Posner interpreted the Hand formula in an explicitly economic way, equating
PL with the economic benefit anticipated from preventing accidents and B with the cost of
prevention. In utilizing this formula, Posner says, the law attempts to reach a "cost-justified"
level of accidents.
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do the whole job of selecting those causally linked acts and activities
collectively deemed not worth doing. Because what is worthwhile
doing necessarily depends on what alternatives exist for accom-
plishing the same result, such a refined fault principle would have
to take into account what other ways were available for avoiding
injury.'9 The size of the penalty to be imposed on faulty behavior
would thus depend on the degree of control exercised over other risk-
bearing activities. This concept, in a sense, was what the Wagon
Mound court would seem, albeit very awkwardly, to have been grop-
ing toward.
If liability were explicitly determined in this manner, the no-
tion of proximate cause would seem to become unnecessary in prac-
tice. Explicit collective consideration" of what activities are worth
controlling relative both to their risk and to the risk incident to
other activities which, if controlled, would also diminish injuries
would be a satisfactory substitute for the requirement of proximity.
Explicit determination of how large a penalty would best do the job
of control, in view of the foreseeable risks of each activity, would
similarly be more direct and effective than the roundabout way
suggested by the language of The Wagon Mound. But the fact re-
mains that the requirement of proximity has not yet been elimi-
nated from tort law. After fault is found (after, that is, an action
has been deemed not worth doing because of its riskiness and its
relative avoidability), proximate cause must still be established.
And penalties are not, The Wagon Mound notwithstanding, based
on a collective judgment of what is appropriate in light of the fore-
seeable dangers of engaging in the controlled activity.
No wonder then that the requirement of proximate cause has
seemed almost paradoxical in a fault system. Its very function as a
"balance striker" between safety and injury costs casts doubt on the
balance initially struck by the fault determination. What function
does fault serve if the balance it strikes needs readjustment through
a requirement of proximate causation? No ready answer can be
found to this question if one views torts solely in terms of collective
deterrence. For if that were the only goal of tort law, one could
clearly do better by refining fault's balance than by playing the
game according to the rules of proximate cause.
Thus, what was true of proximate cause and the compensation
goals is also true of proximate cause and collective deterrence. Prox-
imate cause, as applied, may well further these goals, but the goals
" This is, of course, what Posner's rather utopian definition of fault would do.
20 If not by the judge, then by the jury as collective decision maker.
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by themselves cannot serve to justify its use. To see in its full com-
plexity the role that the concept of proximate cause plays in torts,
as well as to understand, for the first time, the significance of the
requirement of a but for relationship, we must turn to another goal
of tort law-market deterrence.
2. Market or General Deterrence. Although it approaches the
goal differently, market deterrence aims at the same object as
collective deterrence. Both seek to strike a balance between safety
and injury costs by avoiding .only those injuries whose harm is suffi-
ciently great to justify costly avoidance. But while collective deter-
rence would accomplish this end through a political, collective bal-
ancing of safety and injury costs, general or market deterrence
would leave the judgment to an infinity of atomistic, individual
market decisions.
Operating in a world in which perfect markets do not and can-
not exist, a market deterrence approach places injury costs on those
actors who can best decide whether avoidance is cheaper than bear-
ing those costs. The object is to place the incentives for choosing
between accident costs and their avoidance on those actors who, as
a practical matter, we believe will choose most effectively. Thus, the
chosen loss bearer must have better knowledge of the risks involved
and of ways of avoiding them than alternate bearers; he must be in
a better position to use that knowledge efficiently to choose the
cheaper alternative; and finally he must be better placed to induce
modifications in the behavior of others where such modification is
the cheapest way to reduce the sum of accident and safety costs.
The party who in practice best combines these not infrequently
divergent attributes is the "cheapest cost avoider" of an accident
who would be held responsible for the accident costs under the
market deterrence standard.
If selection of such a cheapest cost avoider is the object of
market deterrence, how helpful are the various concepts of causa-
tion I have distinguished for accomplishing it?
Generally a causal link between an activity and an injury would
be required. It would clearly be unproductive to try to induce a
modification in conduct for the purpose of reducing injury costs
unless we believed the conduct to be causally linked to those injury
costs. To put it another way, how can a person be the cheapest cost
avoider of an injury if his actions do not increase the chances that
the injury will occur? An incentive to modify behavior that appears
to increase the chance of injuries is misplaced unless the party held
[43:69
Concerning Cause
liable actually engages in such dangerous behavior.1
The role of but for causation in a system of market deterrence
is less obvious than that of causal linkage. Nevertheless, market
deterrence alone among the tort goals outlined above can explain
the virtual universality of the but for test.
The function of the but for requirement in market deterrence
is to assure that the injury costs allocated to the cheapest cost
avoider include only those costs relevant to the choice between in-
jury and safety. This function is performed by the creation of an
actuarial basis from which actors can decide whether future safety
costs are cheaper or more expensive than future injury costs. Which
party should be the one to make this decision depends, in part, on
the existence of a causal link, a prediction of future risk. But the
future injury costs that should form the basis of the calculation of
relative safety and injury costs for other future cheapest cost
avoiders are defined by assigning to the loss bearer those past injury
costs as to which it was a but for cause.
So viewed, the but for requirement, far from being the essential,
almost categorical imperative it is sometimes described to be, is
simply a useful way of toting up some of the costs the cheapest cost
avoider should face in deciding whether avoidance is worthwhile.
One could do away with the but for test and employ other methods
to achieve the same end. For example, one could simply guess at the
size of the injury costs that will be associated in the future with
behavior causally linked to such injury costs.22 But such an ap-
proach would be unnecessarily vague for a system of market deter-
rence. By using the but for requirement, we tell the chosen loss
22 There is an exception to this requirement of causal linkage as a necessary, though not
sufficient, condition for market deterrence allocation of injury costs. The exception, which
concerns what I have termed the "best briber," is, however, more apparent than real. Logi-
cally, it is possible that an actor is so well-suited: (a) to undertake the cost-benefit analysis;
(b) to determine what other activity could best be modified so as to pick the optimal combina-
tion of accident and safety-engendering behavior; and (c) to induce modifications in this
second activity that we might wish to put liability and thus an incentive on this first "knowl-
edgeable" actor even though it does not personally engage in behavior that increases the risks
of injury. In such a bizarre case the best briber would be the optimal bearer of injury losses
(from a market deterrence viewpoint) even though it would not be directly causally linked to
the injury.
In practice, the problem of allocating losses to a briber who is not causally linked to injury
would rarely arise. In a fault system, moreover, it would seem that it cannot arise since fault
itself begins by requiring defendant behavior that could have been modified to avoid the
injury. The issue has some marginal significance, however, to an understanding of causal
language appropriate to liability systems that abolish the requirement of fault. For that
reason it will be dealt with in some detail in the book of which this paper is only a part.
In a way, that is what collective deterrence does when it guesses that certain behavior
is to be proscribed because of its risk.
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bearer that its burden will equal those costs that, but for its behav-
ior, would not have been incurred; inevitably, therefore, we also tell
the loss bearer that its future insurance premiums will be based on
those injury costs that, in the same but for sense, have resulted from
its past behavior. In this way we can approximate the optimal bur-
den, that is, the burden that will create appropriate incentives to
avoid injuries worth avoiding and not. avoid those injuries that are
too costly to eliminate.
Yet one may question whether the building up of actuarial
insurance figures on a case-by-case basis through the use of the but
for test is the most efficient way of determining the burden to be
placed on the cheapest cost avoider. Random samples of injury costs
associated with certain types of behavior might form an equally
precise and far less expensive way of setting up the incentive for a
correct cost-benefit analysis. The proper choice of method in this
instance depends on whether the administrative costs of case-by-
case determination are viewed as fixed, that is, already incurred in
order to decide whom to burden or whether they are viewed as
marginal, that is, worth bearing only insofar as they give us a more
accurate calculation of what costs should be placed on an already
selected cheapest cost avoider. If we continue to use case-by-case
determination to decide who should bear the loss, then a but for
requirement to define the loss to be borne is not administratively
expensive. If, instead, the category of actor picked to bear the loss
is determined on a more general basis (say, by legislation), then a
sampling of injury costs that could have been avoided by appropri-
ate behavior modification might well be a more efficient way of
calculating the size of the burden (it would be called a tax, rather
than damages) to be imposed. Modification of the loss bearer's be-
havior would reduce the injury costs in future samples and this
modification would, in turn, reduce the future tax burden. Since to
date case-by-case determination has been taken for granted as an
essential mechanism for deciding who should bear losses, however,
it is little wonder that the but for test should also have seemed an
essential part of the system.
To say this, however, is not to say that the but for test should
be viewed as an absolute requirement in case-by-case
determinations. Thus, where it is difficult to prove a but for rela-
tionship" or where either of two independent defendants was a suffi-
n See, e.g., Michie v. Great Lakes Steel, 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
997 (1974), holding that a group of polluters could be liable even though the harm attributable
to each could not be shown; Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), where the
[43:69
Concerning Cause
cient cause of the harm and hence neither was a necessary (but for)
cause, 2 4 it is, at the very least, doubtful whether blind adherence to
the requirement that the victim prove a but for relationship serves
the purposes of market deterrence. The fact that the victim's behav-
ior is also a but for cause in such cases is likely to be viewed as
irrelevant if the victim is not a desirable bearer of the burden in
terms of market deterrence. Functionally, the issue is this: should
the loss be allocated to the defendant in defiance of the strict but
for test or is it better to let the loss fall on the wrong party, the
victim, who by definition is not the cheapest cost avoider? It is little
wonder that in cases of this sort courts have striven mightily, in the
face of the seemingly inexorable requirement of but for relationship,
to ignore the prerequisite and place the loss correctly, if inexactly,
on the defendants.2 5 The limited significance of the but for test in
furthering the only goal of tort law that it serves would demand no
less.
General or market deterrence, then, relies on causal linkage as
one crucial element in identifying the optimal loss bearer. It relies
on but for cause as a sound way of determining, on a case-by-case
basis, what burden-incentive should be placed on the loss bearer.
Yet neither concept, together or separately, suffices to identify the
proper loss bearer. The requirement of proximate cause is necessary
to select from actors who may be cheapest cost avoiders because
they are sufficiently causally linked, those who in fact are.
Various elements in the requirement of proximate cause are
relevant to selecting the cheapest cost avoider. Foreseeability is
obviously germane, for clearly the ability to foresee risks is impor-
tant in comparing accident avoidance costs with safety costs. It may
seem strange that under a proximate cause test costs are allocated
on the basis of past foreseeability, since under a market deterrence
rationale such allocations are designed only to affect future choices
between safety and accident costs. Inquiry into future risk-that is,
plaintiff had clearly been shot by one of two defendants, but it was impossible to tell which
one; the court upheld the jury verdict for the plaintiff by explicitly shifting the burden of proof
on the question of causation to the defendants; Paine v. Gamble Stores, Inc., 202 Minn. 462,
279 N.W. 257 (1938), where plaintiff's deceased was found at the bottom of a pit and the top
rail around the pit was missing; the court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff, apparently
holding that once the plaintiff had shown that a defective railing could have been the but
for cause of the harm, the burden of proving that it was not the cause shifted to defendants.
24 See, e.g., Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902), where a pair of indepen-
dent motorcyclists were held liable for frightening a horse, although it appeared likely that
each cyclist alone would have made enough noise to bring about the harm.
2 This result will generally be reached unless it seems desirable to put an incentive on
the victim to identify which defendant was actually the but for cause of the harm.
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degree of causal linkage-rather than into past foreseeability would
seem appropriate. Yet it is probable that parties who have had
relatively good information about possible risks in the past (that is,
were relatively good foreseers) would also have such information
about the future. Moreover, allocation of those costs, which were
foreseeable in the past, will create incentives for both the loss bear-
ers and others to foresee those injuries that may be worth avoiding
in the future. Thus it follows that, as a practical matter, past fore-
seeability is a useful guide to finding the cheapest cost avoider.
Past foreseeability is not, however, a prerequisite to liability if
the object is market deterrence. A cheapest cost avoider of future
costs exists even though no one could have foreseen what was to
transpire. Even though past injuries were not foreseeable, placing
liability for them on one party rather than another may beneficially
affect future choices from a market deterrence standpoint. If the
effect of such allocations is simply to categorize certain activities as
especially prone to unforeseeable and uninsurable risks, a favorable
market deterrence effect may be achieved.26
Still, foreseeability as it is employed in proximate cause re-
mains a useful factor for defining those activities that market de-
terrence would burden with accident costs. Moreover, the foreseea-
bility of different aspects of an injury may produce a variety of
gradations in ability to choose between injury costs and safety. In
fact, this is how the courts use foreseeability in testing for proximate
cause; as we shall see, the classic rules distinguishing requirements
of foreseeability of type of risk and foreseeability of category of
plaintiff from requirements of foreseeability of extent of damages
make a fair amount of sense in a rough-and-ready way, if a
significant object of the exercise is allocation of losses to the
cheapest cost avoider.
Other aspects of proximate cause are equally relevant to the
determination of which activities are best burdened as cheapest cost
avoiders. Whether one category of loss bearer rather than another
is the best arbiter of future safety and accident costs, or whether
both are equally competent, depends on many characteristics of the
activities viewed in relation to each other. Distance in time and
space or the existence of intervening wrongdoers (or simply of inter-
vening doers) may or may not make a particular actor unsuitable
as a market deterrence loss bearer-even though it was at fault and
even though the actor that is the better loss bearer (whether it be
the victim or the injurer) was not.
" See p. 93 infra.
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The very fact that these factors, crucial to proximate cause
analysis, are not absolute (existence of an intervening cause may,
but need not, make a previous cause too distant) renders them
especially useful in furthering market deterrence. Under market
deterrence principles, distance in time and space or the existence
of intervening causes may make a party engaging in a causally
linked activity so clearly less suited to choose between safety and
accidents as to make burdening it undesirable. On the other hand,
these factors may be irrelevant if the "nearer" actors are less knowl-
edgeable or are, for some other reason, able to shift (externalize) the
loss and hence lack the incentive to choose. Similarly, the fact that
one actor is at fault (that is, we can collectively say that it ought to
have avoided the accident) may or may not mean that it is a better
future cost avoider than another actor who, because more proxi-
mate, has greater knowledge of what its choices entail. And this
uncertainty persists whether or not we can collectively say that this
second actor ought to have chosen safety (that is, was at fault).
Proximate cause limits the degree to which even a fault system
allocates losses on the basis of fault by considering as relevant, but
not conclusive, factors that help define the cheapest cost avoiders.
In this way it serves the goal of market deterrence, which would also
consider those factors as relevant, but not decisive, and which would
not be overly impressed by the collective judgment implicit in a
finding of fault.
Some of the factors relevant to selecting the cheapest cost
avoiders could be introduced by doctrines other than proximate
cause. Causal linkage, for example, could be useful for this purpose,
especially if one considered degree of causal linkage (that is, pre-
dictability as to how much the recurrence of one activity, relative
to others, increased the risk of injury). But degree of causal linkage
by itself would not raise all those issues that "proximity," as it is
broadly understood, raises relevant to defining the cheapest cost
avoiders. It does not, for example, take into account the relative
knowledge of the danger possessed by the different parties. Another
doctrine, assumption of risk, can readily take that into account, but
it, in turn, does not focus on the capacity of the parties to external-
ize the costs and thereby neutralize any incentive effect. Proximate
cause, by its very vagueness, permits these and other factors to be
considered. It is likely, therefore, to remain significant even if the
role of other doctrines in furthering market deterrence were ex-
panded.
Proximate cause, though significant in furthering market de-
terrence, cannot be fully explained in terms of market deterrence,
nor can it do the whole job required by market deterrence. While
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the doctrine may serve to limit the liability of faulty injurers and
leave the losses on non-faulty, perhaps more proximate victims, it
cannot serve to do the reverse and burden faultless, but "very proxi-
mate" injurers. And, if the sole object of tort law were market de-
terrence, more direct ways than proximate cause could be discov-
ered for applying the factors relevant to selecting the best loss
bearer. But tort law does not serve a single goal. There are elements
in the requirement of proximate cause that are useful in furthering
the compensation and even the collective deterrence goals of tort
law. As such, even though it would not serve any single goal ideally,
the requirement may be fundamental to our actual system of tort
law based, as it is, on many goals.
The same is, of course, true of the other requirements of causa-
tion. The deterrence goals generally require causal linkage; and they
may be so fundamental in tort law as to make that requirement an
almost absolute prerequisite to liability. Given case-by-case deter-
mination of responsibility, market deterrence may add but for cause
as a useful, indeed almost fundamental, prerequisite. At that point
the requirement of proximity in causation, although potentially use-
ful in the achievement of both collective and market deterrence,
may instead be employed to further spreading. For example, imag-
ine an accident unforeseeable to either victim or injurer, in which,
after the accident, we find that the behavior of both injurer and
.victim was a but for cause and was causally linked to the injury.2
In such a case, whether the losses were left on the victim or moved
to the injurer might depend on their relative ability to choose be-
tween injury and safety in the future, or it might depend on which
party could best spread the losses already incurred. As a practical
matter, the test of proximate cause could be used to do either.
Indeed, it could serve one goal in one such case and the other in a
different one. Nearly as good cost avoiders might have very different
spreading potential in one case, while equally good spreaders might
be very differently situated to choose between injury and safety in
another.
Causation, viewed as a set of functional concepts, must respond
to the sum of the goals of tort law. Causal linkage and but for cause
are functionally related to few, but fundamental tort aims. Proxi-
mate cause is, however, related to all such goals. It is little wonder
then that it has always seemed the most complex, paradoxical, but
also "flexible" and policy-based of the causal requirements. Indeed,
" Both parties' behavior may have been faulty or both may have been blameless or one
faulty and the other blameless.
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its very flexibility and explicitly functional policy orientation some-
times serve to hide the equally functional, rather than absolute,
roles played by the other concepts.
IX. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO A FEW TRADITIONAL
CASES
The foregoing analysis of causation in terms of functional tort
goals may be applied in determining liability under both fault and
non-fault systems. Given the present space limitations, however, I
shall apply it here only to a few classic cases decided within the fault
system under the rubric of "proximate cause" and the subsidiary
concept of foreseeability of harm. 21
A. Market Deterrence and Foreseeability of Unusual Damage
As noted above,29 use of the concept of but for cause in addition
to the concept of causal link can be understood only insofar as one
goal of tort law is market deterrence. Both causal elements have
traditionally been accepted as virtually absolute prerequisites to
liability under the fault system, suggesting that in practice the law
has considered market deterrence to be a crucial goal of tort law.
Taking as given that market deterrence is a fundamental starting
point of causal analysis and assuming that the prerequisites of mar-
ket deterrence (causal linkage and, to a lesser extent, but for rela-
tionship) have been satisfied, has the law utilized the requirement
of proximate cause in a manner consistent with the promotion of
market deterrence goals? An exploration of three classic situations
dealing with one element of proximate cause-foreseeability of unu-
sual damage-should serve as a convenient vehicle for examining
this question.
The first case, exemplified by Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 3
involves limited or absent foreseeability of category of plaintiff. In
Palsgraf railroad employees helping a passenger onto a train negli-
gently caused him to drop a package he was carrying. Unknown to
them, the package contained fireworks. When it fell, the fireworks
exploded, causing some scales on the other side of the platform to
fall and strike Mrs. Palsgraf, injuring her. While harm to the pas-
senger boarding the train was a foreseeable risk of the negligent
2 In the forthcoming book I will apply the analysis to many other, more difficult "fault"
cases and to various systems of non-fault liability.
See p. 85 supra.
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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behavior, harm to Mrs. Palsgraf, who was standing well out of the
way, was held not to be. At most it was only barely foreseeable that
endangering the package might harm a distant bystander.3 1
The second case, epitomized by the "thin skull" or "eggshell
plaintiff" hypothetical, involves limited or absent foreseeability of
extent of damages. The defendant does something wrong. It is
deemed faulty because it is easily avoidable and likely to do the
plaintiff a small, but not insignificant injury. Plaintiff has a thin
skull and dies. Plaintiffs with thin skulls are foreseeable (whatever
courts might say), but their presence (like the chance of harm to
bystanders in Palsgraf) is sufficiently rare that the foreseeable harm
would not, by itself, justify calling the defendant's conduct negli-
gent.
The third case involves limited or absent foreseeability of what
is rather loosely termed "type" of damage. The defendant gives his
three-year-old daughter a loaded gun; the daughter drops the gun
on the toe of an elderly relative. Even though the gun does not go
off, the relative is seriously injured. Loaded guns are very difficult
objects for three-year-olds to hold; this fact, which establishes cau-
sal linkage, is either unforeseeable or not sufficiently likely to make
handing loaded guns to infants faulty behavior. What makes the
conduct faulty is, of course, the danger that the child will fire the
gun; but that did not occur.32
What effect, in all these cases, should limited foreseeability or
absence of foreseeability have on the proximate cause decision when
that decision is viewed from a market deterrence standpoint? The
issue posed by this question would seem to be no more than: which
category, plaintiff or defendant, had the better ability to choose the
safer alternative as far as this unexpected or barely expected dam-
age was concerned?
1, By stretching the term "foreseeable," it would be possible to construct a scenario in
which Mrs. Palsgraf would have been a foreseeable plaintiff. Thus, the first passenger might
have attempted to retrieve his package, despite the fact that the train was moving. In doing
so he might have been injured. Mrs. Palsgraf and various other bystanders might have rushed
up to help (after all, danger invites rescue). And in the rush, Mrs. Palsgraf might have been
hurt. Nevertheless, this danger of injury to Mrs. Palsgraf would not, by itself, have justified
calling defendant's conduct wrongful.
312 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co. (The Wagon Mound),
[1961] A.C. 388 (N.S.W.), is another example of a case in which the type of damage was
unforeseeable. In that case the defendant's employees had negligently discharged furnace oil
into Sydney's harbor, thus risking some foreseeable harm by the oil as grease or muck.
However, plaintiff's workmen, who were using acetylene torches, accidently ignited some rags
which in turn ignited the furnace oil, causing extensive damage in the harbor. Because the
defendant could not have foreseen the risk of fire the Privy Council refused to hold him liable.
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The fact that one party cannot foresee a certain kind of damage
does not automatically exclude it as a cheapest cost avoider, al-
though the chances that it is are reduced. Unforeseeable risks may,
as a statistical matter, cluster around certain activities. If those
engaging in such activities are held liable for those unforeseeable
damages, the activities will acquire a reputation for being finan-
cially risky. As such, they may be undertaken to a lesser extent or
undertaken only by those who find them especially valuable, by
people who, more than most of us, enjoy taking risks, or finally by
entrepreneurs, that is, those who are willing to gamble on their
knack for avoiding even unforeseeable risks more successfully than
most people. Thus, even in the absence of foreseeability or in the
presence of only very limited foreseeability, such modifications
would serve to reduce the sum of accident and safety costs, that is,
to further market deterrence. Indeed, they may do so better than
allocation of the risks to the injured plaintiff would, even if the
plaintiff could foresee the very "excess" risks that we have assumed
the defendant category could perceive barely, if at all. The plaintiff
category might, if burdened, shift the loss to another category, such
as a social insurance fund, which would be totally incapable of
choosing between safety and accident costs. Or the plaintiff cate-
gory might be unable to modify its behavior even if it foresaw the
risks of the excess injury. Still, the less the risks are foreseeable to
the defendant and the more they are foreseeable to the plaintiff
category, the more plausible it is that the plaintiff category is the
cheapest avoider of the costs involved.
Given all this, one can begin to understand how the distinctions
between barely foreseeable or unforeseeable category of plaintiff
(Palsgraf), extent of damages (the thin skull case), and type of
damage (the loaded gun case) may, in a very crude sense, corre-
spond to distinctions made in a search for the cheapest cost avoider.
1. Foreseeability of Category of Plaintiff. The fact that we are
prepared to say that the defendant could have avoided a given loss
more easily than one category of plaintiff says very little about the
relative ability of the same defendant to avoid the same loss when
compared to a totally different and perhaps unforeseeable category
of plaintiff. The first category of plaintiff might not be able to fore-
see the loss at all or might not be able to act on whatever he could
foresee. On the other hand, a different plaintiff category might be
in a much better position than the defendant to foresee the loss and
balance its risk against safety costs. If the second category of plain-
tiff is unforeseeable, the defendant may be unable to gauge whether
this second plaintiff was a better arbiter than the defendant as to
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safety and injury costs and therefore was the one who should have
undertaken whatever safety measures, if any, were appropriate to
avoid injury to himself. While this ignorance does not absolutely
exclude defendant liability, it does make it considerably less likely,
for one aspect of being the cheapest cost avoider is knowing that you
are likely to bear the burden of making the cost-benefit analysis.
At the very least, the existence of an unforeseeable or only
slightly foreseeable plaintiff requires the court or jury to make an
independent examination of relative cost avoidance potential be-
tween the defendant and this plaintiff category. The fact that the
defendant was the better cost avoider vis-&-vis another foreseeable
plaintiff category would tell us little, if anything, about how this
examination should come out. This is true even when different cate-
gories of foreseeable plaintiffs are involved, but we would expect
differences in result to become more pronounced as the categories
of plaintiffs become increasingly unexpected. For example, the fact
that a defendant landowner is the cheapest avoider of certain losses
with respect to most categories of invitees does not mean that he is
also the cheapest cost avoider with respect to many categories of
trespassers or even certain licensees.3 3 Similarly, the fact that a
construction company is the cheapest avoider of injuries to children
caused by loose pipes left on a playground may, but need not, mean
that it is also the cheapest avoider of injuries to adult fools who are
also injured there. 34 The issue in the latter instance is whether the
category "fool" is a cheaper avoider than the category "construction
company." In the given case I doubt that it would be, and I expect
that a court would agree and impose liability. However, the fact
that the construction company was a better cost avoider than the
category "children" would not be decisive.
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that Cardozo's
emphasis on category of plaintiff in Palsgraf, though too strong if
taken literally (as Cardozo in fact never did), is understandable
largely, if not totally, in terms of market deterrence. As The Wagon
Mound in effect demonstrated, it is not comprehensible in terms of
collective deterrence. What the defendant did was wrongful and to
be avoided because of foreseeable harm to one kind of plaintiff, so
how can it be any less wrongful because harm occurred to another
category of plaintiff? Probably, as The Wagon Mound suggests,
collective deterrence would require a limitation of the penalty to the
33I do not mean to suggest, however, that the virtually discredited "status on the land"
categories are sufficiently refined to provide an adequate test.
3 See, e.g., Terranella v. Union Bldg. & Constr. Co., 3 N.J. 443, 70 A.2d 753 (1950).
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foreseeable degree of harm, but surely it would be irrelevant to
collective deterrence whom that foreseeable extent of harm struck. 5
Paradoxically, given that he never openly questioned the premises
of the fault system and therefore, in a sense, the goal of collective
deterrence, Cardozo's approach can only be explained in terms of
market deterrence or compensation goals. Significantly, however,
these goals, though only implicit, were often readily identifiable in
his opinions."
2. Foreseeability of Extent of Damage. The very crude way in
which limited or absent foreseeability of category of plaintiff is rele-
vant to finding a cheapest cost avoider has little parallel when the
limited or absent foreseeability relates simply to the extent of dam-
ages that are of the same "type" as those readily foreseeable and
that injure the same category of plaintiff. By and large, if a defen-
dant category is the cheapest avoider of one type of damage vis-d-
vis a given category of plaintiff, then that same defendant will be
the cheapest avoider of any related, but unforeseeable or barely
foreseeable extra damages to the same category of plaintiff. While
it is possible, it is not very likely that a plaintiff category that was
not as well-suited as the defendant to avoid the readily foreseeable
harm would be better suited to avoid the excess damages. Hence,
the general common law rule that, once proximate cause between
defendant's fault and the injury exists, liability extends to more
serious, but unexpected damages as well, seems to be a good starting
point from a market deterrence point of view-37 It is, however, only
a starting point, a rough approximation. Like the rule that liability
exists only to foreseeable plaintiffs, it makes sense in terms of mar-
' The same result would follow from a strict reading of the Learned Hand test. The
"avoidance" side of the balance holds nothing: the defendant is already bound to alter his
behavior to prevent injury to the fully foreseeable plaintiff, hence there is no further avoid-
ance cost implied in protecting against other possible plaintiffs. The danger side of the
balance holds whatever peppercorn of risk the miniscule foreseeability of these other catego-
ries of plaintiffs entails. Infinitesimal though the foreseeability is, however, it is enough to
tilt the scale, since there is nothing on the other side. Thus, under the Hand test, the
defendant must be held negligent to the barely foreseeable plaintiffs, if he is negligent to some
highly foreseeable ones.
" For a Cardozo opinion in which the cost-benefit analysis involved in accident cases was
explicit, see Adams v. Bullock, 227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E. 93 (1919). The effect of compensation
goals may help explain the difference between his opinions in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928), and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
17 Collective deterrence, and hence the Wagon Mound rationale, would, of course, require
a different tack. Liability would be limited to the foreseeable extent of harm. Yet, if applied
fully, this rationale would require the same level of liability even when that degree of harm
failed to materialize.
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ket deterrence only if, in practice, exceptions are made to it. The
Cardozo "foreseeability of plaintiff" rule works reasonably well be-
cause the content of the term "foreseeability" is sufficiently flexible
and manipulable to permit appropriate deviations. Similarly, the
rule imposing liability for unlimited, unforeseeable damages works
reasonably well, from a market deterrence standpoint, because its
effect is controlled by other doctrines which, in appropriate cases,
may be used to reduce its scope.
The doctrines used to limit the scope of the rule permitting
unforeseeable damages ad infinitum are not, by and large, proxi-
mate cause doctrines.18 They tend instead to be introduced through
concepts of assumption of risk (in its primary sense 9) and, on occa-
sion, through contributory negligence. A great violinist who goes to
work in a steel mill and whose hands are mangled as a result of the
mill owner's fault is not likely to recover for his "extra, unforeseea-
ble" damages. Many courts would say that he had assumed the risk
of such harm, because he had greater knowledge of the unusual
possible damages and could have found alternate employment less
dangerous to his hands. Yet the violinist would probably be able to
recover for the same excess damage to his hands if they were injured
in a car accident. He might have greater knowledge of the particular
risk involved than the defendant could have, but that knowledge
would not provide him with any meaningful alternatives." The de-
fendant in this situation, unlike the defendant in the steel mill case,
would, if he were the cheapest avoider of the original injury, also be
the cheapest avoider of the unlikely extra damages.
The same types of distinctions that limit and refine the rule
permitting unforeseeable damages so that it serves market deter-
By defining the excess damages as being of a different "type" from those that have
been foreseen, courts can, of course, employ proximate cause doctrines to limit recoveries of
unforeseen or barely foreseen excess damages. Andrews, J., dissenting in Palsgraf, would have
employed proximate cause directly to limit the extent of damages, but foreseeability in his
view would have been only one factor in determining the appropriate limits.
31 In its primary sense, assumption of risk does not require that the plaintiff's conduct
be in any way negligent or wrongful. It does require that the risk in question is one of which
people like the plaintiff are ordinarily aware, that the plaintiff has meaningful alternatives
to bearing the risk, and that the defendant has a right (a weasel word) to impose the choice
between taking and avoiding the risk on the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brown v. San Francisco Ball
Club, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 222 P.2d 19 (1950); cf. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions,
Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959), which rejects assumption of risk in its secondary sense
(as a sort of contributory negligence) and questions whether its primary function is best
accomplished by a separate doctrine, like assumption of risk, or through definitions of con-
cepts like negligence and duty designed to achieve the same kinds of limits on liability.
"0 In our society staying at home is not a meaningful alternative, and protective gloves
do not exist.
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rence goals can be seen in other classic hypotheticals as well. If the
package belonging to the passenger in Palsgraf had contained a
Ming vase, the defendant probably would not have been held liable
for the extraordinary damages caused by the breakage, despite the
basic common law rule imposing liability and despite the fact that
the risk that made the defendant's behavior faulty in the first place
was precisely the risk of damage to the package.41 Some courts
would have found contributory negligence in this situation, others
assumption of risk; whatever the terminology, the result appears
foreordained and in accord with market deterrence goals. Con-
versely, the person with a thin skull generally recovers for all his
injuries even though his knowledge of the condition must be vastly
superior to the defendant's. Knowledge without alternatives (ade-
quate helmets do not exist; if they did, the cases might well be
different) does not make a category of actor a cheap cost avoider.
And placing liability on the plaintiff as a market deterrence incen-
tive to inform potential defendants of the particular risk seems rela-
tively useless in such cases since the defendant, by and large, will
be a driver who could not readily receive the information. In con-
trast there are cases in which information can be given, as where
signs are erected informing drivers that a nursing home is nearby
or, to use the reverse case, where adequate warning of potential
harms from the use of a product is given and the burden of making
the cost-benefit analysis is thereby shifted to the plaintiff, who can
no longer successfully claim that the harm resulted from a product
defect.4"
Such non-proximate cause limitations on the common law rule
governing excess damages are, of course, fairly crude. To produce
more refined rules, it would be necessary to refer to market deter-
rence directly as the only goal of tort law, an approach that would
clearly be incorrect. In all probability such a direct reliance on
market deterrence would limit "extra" or "unusual" damages more
than is done by existing tort doctrines. For example, it has been
suggested that at least highly individualized pain and suffering
might be left on the victims of some categories of injuries, even if
other damages, including some basic level of pain and suffering,
were placed on injurers. 3 The tone of such writings suggests market
" Cf. the last paragraph of Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf.
,' This definition of the functional role of warning and defect is reflected in Sills v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969). See generally Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
" See, e.g., HALDI ASSOCIATES, INC., A STUDY OF HAWAII'S MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
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deterrence reasons for this split allocation. Some legislation, gener-
ally of a non-fault, market deterrence sort, has followed this model."
All that, however, begins to push us outside the scope of the present
discussion toward a consideration of the role of causal concepts in a
world of non-fault liability where one might plausibly argue that the
specific goals of tort law should be clearly identified and served.
3. Foreseeability of Type of Damage. Ability to foresee cate-
gory of plaintiff, as the common law defines it, is highly relevant to
selecting cheapest cost avoiders. Ability to foresee extent of dam-
ages is much less relevant, especially given the existence of concepts
like assumption of risk. Ability to foresee type of damages, once
more as defined by the common law, lies somewhere in between.
The example used above for unforeseeable or only slightly fore-
seeable type of injuries was the case in which an adult handed a
loaded gun to an infant. The child drops it on the toe of an elderly
person who is seriously injured even though the gun does not go off.
It is known, either before or after the accident, that loaded guns are
particularly hard for infants to hold. Causal linkage is, therefore,
established because the evidence indicates that handing loaded
guns to children substantially increases the risk that they will be
dropped and thus the risk that elderly feet will be injured as a result.
Our initial, instinctive reaction to this rather outlandish hypo-
thetical is to want to hold the negligent defendant liable. That
reaction, I would suggest, is based on collective deterrence grounds.
The foreseeable harm from handing an infant a loaded gun is enor-
mous; the harm that occurred is certainly no greater than the ex-
pected harm; the collective deterrence penalty appropriate to the
defendant would be at least as great as the damages suffered; then
why not hold the defendant liable? Such reasoning, of course, would
justify the same serious penalty even if no harm had occurred. In a
system of mixed goals, penalizing dangerous behavior in the absence
of actual harm might be inappropriate, and yet collective deterrence
goals might still compel the imposition of liability in the hypotheti-
cal case if, at the very least, other goals were not clearly furthered
by non-liability.
PROGRAM (Special Report No. 72-1, to the Legislature of the State of Hawaii) 90, 110 (1972);
cf. G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 223-24.
" Leaving pain and suffering damages on the victims was one of the major proposals in
most compensation schemes for victims of automobile accidents. See, e.g., R. KEETON & J.
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMO-
BILE INSURANCE (1965). In addition to automobile compensation statutes, workmen's compen-
sation statutes have also declined to impose highly individualized pain and suffering damages
on the injurer.
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This collective deterrence effect may be demonstrated by con-
trasting a variation on Palsgraf with the hypothetical case. In
Palsgraf the defendant's negligence consisted of unnecessarily en-
dangering the package. Suppose that the owner of the package had
had a "thin shoulder" and that, while shoving him onto the train
in a non-negligent manner except with respect to the package, the
railroad employees jostled his arm so that it was severely injured
and had to be amputated. Here, unlike the gun hypothetical, there
is no collective deterrence equivalence between the wrong commit-
ted and the penalty to be imposed; hence, our instinct is to say "no
liability." Cardozo himself suggested that result in Palsgraf. Yet
that same result does not commend itself in the ordinary thin skull
case where equivalence between wrong and penalty is also missing.45
In the thin skull case damage is of the same type as that foreseen
and thus market deterrence (absent assumption of risk) is furthered
by placing the loss on the defendant despite the lack of equivalence
between his wrong and the burden imposed on him. The above
variation on Palsgraf, in which the type of damage is different, is
less clearly a case where the negligent defendant, though the chea-
pest avoider of the easily foreseeable risk, is generally the cheapest
avoider of the less foreseeable one as well. In such a situation the
courts, if guided by market deterrence principles, would hesitate to
start with a general rule of liability that was limited only by other
doctrines such as assumption of risk. But they would be equally
hesitant to start with a rule of non-liability (as in unforeseeable
plaintiff situations) to be modified only through manipulation of the
content of "foreseeability." It is little wonder, then, that the pres-
sure of other goals, such as collective deterrence, is more obviously
felt in this case.
The circumstances surrounding the occurrence of an unex-
pected type of damage may suggest that the defendant who is the
best bearer of the basic loss for market deterrence purposes is not
the best bearer of the different type of loss. But they may suggest
the opposite. Or they may simply leave us perplexed on the point
and hence more prone to follow the dictates of other goals (whether
collective deterrence as in the "loaded gun" case or compensation),
which may seem to be clearly furthered by one result or another. It
is not surprising, therefore, that such cases appear at first glance to
be the most mixed up of all the "unexpected damage" cases. Courts
I The exception is, of course, The Wagon Mound, which is not followed consistently
precisely because its logic is entirely collective deterrence, and torts is not based on that goal
alone; cf. Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., [1962] 2 Q.B. 405.
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and commentators talk one way, or occasionally both ways, but
however they talk, "type" is defined so loosely that cases come out
every which way.4"
This very confusion would seem to suggest that it would be
better to concentrate directly on the effect that foreseeability of
either extent, type, or plaintiff has on relative cost avoidance poten-
tial. Would it not be better to lump all such cases under proximate
cause and then consider, given the particular facts, which category
of actor was the cheapest cost avoider? If, as I suggest, the different
foreseeablities are at best only suggestive of cheapness of cost avoid-
ance and if market deterrence were the sole goal of tort law, it would
seem better to treat all of them as raising the identical prob-
lem-how does relative forseeability affect market deterrence in this
instance?-and then find the solution according to the facts of the
particular case. All the difficulties of categorization that have long
plagued the courts-is this a case of different type or extent of
damages?-would then be avoided.47 Nevertheless, the suggested
solution does not necessarily follow. Focusing clearly on market de-
terrence may, in practice, fail to further even market deterrence
goals. 8 And it would likely alter the treatment currently accorded
other goals of tort law, goals that are no less important than market
deterrence.
B. The Interplay of Different Tort Goals
If market deterrence were the only goal of tort law, then all
causation problems would be reduced to a search for the cheapest
cost avoider. Tort law, however, is a system that responds to mixed
goals. As a result, certain concepts of causation (like causal link)
that may be crucial to market deterrence may be ignored if other
,s When different "type" of damage reflects a situation in which no causal link exists,
however, the courts have little trouble in finding no liability. In my gun hypothetical, liability
is usually denied because the crucial causal link that I have assumed, that is, loaded guns
are particularly hard for infants to hold, is missing. Without it the defendant is almost
certainly not the cheapest cost avoider, and collective deterrence or compensation goals do
not seem to suffice to impose liability where market deterrence so clearly would not.
,7 That the distinctions are difficult to make is almost tautological. If the distinctions
are made in the first place, not because of something inherent in type, extent, or category of
plaintiff, but only because these terms provide rough guides for determining relative ability
to make a cost-benefit analysis, then the distinctions are bound to be hard to make except
on the basis of market deterrence principles.
" See p. 107 infra. The forthcoming book will expand on the notion raised here that
clearly focusing on one goal, because it makes that goal too obvious and subject to attack,
may actually serve to subvert the goal in a society dedicated to mixed goals.
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goals are sufficiently pressing,49 while other concepts (like proximate
cause) may be employed to further these other goals even though
they would not come into play if the goals were examined in isola-
tion. If tort law is viewed in this light, it becomes possible to explain
certain causation cases which, regarded solely from the standpoint
of one goal, are hard to understand.
1. Collective Deterrence Goals. I have already noted how the
desire to further collective deterrence may modify causation cases.
Indeed, Palsgraf itself is sometimes explained by saying that the
foreseeable wrong was too small to justify liability for the damages
that occurred; but this explanation, appropriate enough in collec-
tive deterrence terms, conflicts with the doctrine Cardozo
enunciated in the case itself. If Cardozo had adopted such a stance
he would have promulgated a Wagon Mound, rather than a Palsgraf
doctrine. That he did not do so does not mean that he was insensi-
tive to the pressures of collective deterrence." On the contrary, it
simply means that collective deterrence was not his sole aim and
that he took into account rough equivalence between wrong and
penalty when the influence of other goals either pushed the same
way or was inconclusive. Thus, the highly manipulable concept of
foreseeability of plaintiff category, which makes some sense in terms
of market deterrence but which could be used to respond to collec-
tive deterrence pressures as well, might instinctively have seemed
the best "doctrinal" answer to Cardozo. When one adds to this
Cardozo's desire to center the major part of this difficult melding
of goals in the court instead of the jury, the Palsgraf doctrine seems
quite intelligible.
For reasons I have gone into elsewhere, I do not think it is
desirable to mix collective and market deterrence goals in one sys-
tem. 51 Results like The Wagon Mound which hamper market deter-
rence, but do not go far enough to achieve adequate collective de-
" It is possible, though not necessary, to read cases like Kernan v. American Dredging
Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958), and Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 130 Iowa
123, 106 N.W. 498 (1906), in this way.
50 Indeed, one way of explaining other Cardozo results is precisely in terms of achieving
some equivalence between wrong and penalty. Compare Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)(purchaser allowed to recover when
injured by defective automobile), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441 (1931) (creditors not allowed to recover against auditors who had negligently certified the
debtor to be solvent), and H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E.
896 (1928) (plaintiffs injured by a widespread fire not allowed to recover against waterworks
that negligently failed to maintain necessary water pressure).
", See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 2.
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terrence, seem all too likely.2 Yet, so long as our tort system remains
a fault system, it must be admitted that the deterrence goals im-
plicit in the system include both collective and market deterrence
(although, as I have argued, even the fault system emphasizes mar-
ket deterrence at least as much as collective deterrence). The
Wagon Mound, though admittedly more internally logical than
Palsgraf, unlike Palsgraf, is clearly wrong because it ignores the
fundamental market deterrence aspects of tort law. Cases that ig-
nore altogether equivalency of wrong and penalty (that is, collective
deterrence) from my point of view are not similarly wrong; rather
they are part and parcel of the movement away from a fault system,
which mixes both deterrence goals with compensation aims, toward
a non-fault system, which mixes compensation goals with market
deterrence alone.
2. Compensation Goals. Even more than collective deter-
rence, compensation aims can explain why causation cases often
differ from what they would be in practice if judges and juries re-
sponded solely to market deterrence principles. Consider, for exam-
ple, how spreading and distribution goals influence both the doc-
trine and the outcome of the cases discussed above concerning un-
foreseeable (or barely foreseeable) extent of damage, type of dam-
age, and category of plaintiff.
At the doctrinal level, compensation goals will move in the
same direction as market deterrence: a party who is the best
spreader of foreseeable costs is very likely to be the best spreader of
the same type of costs when they simply turn out to be greater than
expected. A point may be reached when insurance coverage is ex-
hausted or ability to self-insure no longer exists 3 But, in the ordi-
nary case, the fact that damages are greater than expected, but of
the same sort as expected, would not alter the identity of the party
best suited to spread them. Again, the doctrinal (as opposed to the
ad hoc) exceptions made by the courts-for example, assumption of
risk with respect to a violinist-steel worker's hands-are the very
ones in which different knowledge suggests different likelihood of
insurance and hence different ability to spread as to the excess.
Where it is the type of damage that is barely foreseeable, on the
other hand, the party who can best spread the foreseeable damages
52 Penalties remain foolishly bound to but for relationships. Insurance is allowed when
it is not desirable in collective deterrence terms. And the focus on the injurer's limited
foreseeability ignores the possible inability of the victim to choose between injury and safety.
" It will be instructive to consider specific cases where that seemed likely, to see how
the courts deal with such situations. For my definition of "self-insure" see p. 75 supra.
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is by no means necessarily the best one to spread the unforeseeable
loss. Insurance coverage by defendants seems less likely when the
unforeseeable damages are of a different type, and thus, even
though ability to self-insure would most likely remain unchanged as
to such damages, a spreading reason for treating unforeseeable types
of damages differently from unforeseeable extent of damages can
readily be perceived. It may not, as Robert Morris suggests, 54 be a
good reason in practice, but it is at least an understandable one.
Finally, when the category of plaintiff is not foreseeable, the
relative likelihood of self-insurance as between defendant and
plaintiff, no less than the relative likelihood of insurance, is in
doubt. Again, this uncertainty does not mean that an absolute rule,
relentlessly applied to exclude defendants from liability to unfore-
seeable plaintiff categories would be sensible from a spreading point
of view. Indeed, unforeseeable plaintiffs may themselves be such
poor spreaders that it is more desirable to make the unforeseeing
defendant liable. But it is not hard to see how, if it is used only as
a flexible starting point, a doctrine that rejects defendant liability
to unforeseeable plaintiffs might frequently be consistent with
spreading goals.
Doctrines, however, paint in broad strokes; individual cases
may present particular spreading problems not dealt with by rules
not focused on spreading. Because the proximate cause determina-
tion belongs to the jury, proximate cause doctrine is especially well-
suited to modifying results in individual fact situations. Since juries
do not give reasons, however, it is difficult to gauge the influence of
spreading on the decision-making process. Folk wisdom tells us it
has great significance. Indeed, fear of the degree to which juries will
introduce spreading notions to the detriment of other goals has been
given as an explanation for doctrinal rules removing some part of
the liability decision from the proximate cause inquiry and hence
from the jury as well. If that is indeed the case, one would expect
that jury determinations of proximity, when permitted, frequently
reflect spreading aims.
More interesting is the fact that even court decisions in particu-
lar cases seem to employ proximate cause to achieve spreading
goals, at least where market deterrence is not much of a guide. The
results in Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. and Republic of France
& Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. United States,55 which
would be hard to explain in terms of ordinary foreseeability of type
" Morris, supra note 8.
Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963), was an FELA action by a railroad
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and extent of damage rules, can be readily understood if one takes
into account the particular spreading situations involved. In
Gallick, despite a lack of foreseeability in regard to a serious acci-
dent caused by insect bites, the railroad was probably the cheapest
cost avoider; it was clearly in a better position to pay for such losses
now and insure against them in the future. Thus market deterrence
and spreading considerations converged to require defendant liabil-
ity; the Supreme Court so held, brushing aside lack of foreseeability
of the type of damages. In the Republic of France case (in which the
crucial original defendant was the French Shipping Lines), market
deterrence might again have leaned slightly toward defendant
liability, but spreading leaned the opposite way. The United States,
standing in the shoes of victims it had voluntarily compensated in
part, sought to shift the whole burden of the loss to the injurer.
Scant victim compensation and many other secondary dislocations
would have followed. Lack of foreseeability was, realistically, only
of extent of damages, but the term "proximate cause" proved suffi-
ciently flexible to deny liability without going to a Wagon Mound
doctrine."
In the Republic of France case, spreading goals inconsistent
with weak and uncertain market deterrence requirements seemed to
dominate; at times, in a system of mixed goals, they may even
employee who was bitten by an insect while working near a stagnant pool on railroad prop-
erty. The bite became infected, and both of the plaintiff's legs had to be amputated. While
the railroad was clearly negligent in maintaining the pool, it argued that there was insuffi-
cient causal connection between the negligence and the harm to warrant liability. At trial
the jury held for the plaintiff, the state appellate court reversed on the grounds that there
had been no causal connection, and the Supreme Court reversed again, reinstating the jury
verdict. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence of a causal connection to present
a jury question.
Republic of France & Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. United States, 290 F.2d
395 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 804 (1962), arose out of the Texas City disaster in
which an explosion on the S.S. Grandcamp "on April 16, 1947, resulted in more than 500
deaths, more than 3000 personal injuries, and tremendous destruction of and damage to
property." Id. at 396. The United States, after winning a series of suits brought against it
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, proceeded under the Act of Aug. 12, 1955, ch. 864, 69
Stat. 707-09 (Texas City Relief Act), to compensate uninsured claims up to a maximum of
$25,000 per claim. As assignee of partly compensated victims, it pressed claims against the
French Lines (the charterer) and the Republic of France (the owner of the ship). One individ-
ual claimant, which had been unwilling to assign its claim of nearly $5 million, joined the
United States' action. The court, employing proximate cause language, declined to hold the
petitioners liable for any claims arising out of the explosion.
, Indeed, even in England after The Wagon Mound, decisions like Smith v. Leech Brain
& Co., [1962] 2 Q.B. 405, in situations similar to Gailick, suggest that equivalency of wrong
and penalty-the collective deterrence goal of The Wagon Mound-may be relaxed if suffi-
ciently in conflict with spreading goals.
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dominate fairly clear market deterrence pressures. Occasional cases
can be found where liability was imposed even though causal link-
age was very doubtful or even nonexistent. 7 Because of the signifi-
cance of market deterrence such cases are, as one would expect,
quite rare. And where they do appear they can frequently be
explained as attacks on the concept of fault rather than on market
deterrence; causal linkage to wrongful behavior is generally absent,
but close causal linkage to other defendant behavior that is not
wrongful is present and the defendant would easily be the cheapest
cost avoider in a non-fault system of liability. Still, it should not be
surprising that, in a system of mixed goals, spreading goals occa-
sionally dictate a result that market deterrence would reject because
no relevant causal linkage exists.
Such is the inevitable result of having a system of mixed goals
in which discussion of those goals is conducted in an alien lan-
guage-the language of causation. For the principles of causation,
while capable of responding to the several tort goals, are not con-
sciously directed at them or at any particular mixture of them.
Whether this arrangement is desirable or whether it would be better
to eschew causal language and to deal with each of the goals self-
consciously and explicitly, mixing them according to some, itself
self-conscious, formula remains to be discussed.
Ill. THE LANGUAGE OF CAUSATION AND
THE GOALS OF TORT LAW
Causal requirements, like all other legal requirements, must
ultimately justify themselves in functional terms. Law is a human
construct designed to accomplish certain goals. Often-perhaps
most of the time-the goals are terribly complex and hard to ana-
lyze clearly, and one is properly suspicious of analysis and prescrip-
tion that would discard time-honored legal terms because one can-
not find immediate, clear policy justifications for them. Still, the
object of law is to serve human needs, and thus legal terms (which
in other contexts may have other, deeper meanings) must sooner or
later be linked to the service of human needs.
In this sense many seemingly significant philosophical ques-
tions concerning cause become irrelevant to the use of that term in
law. To amplify: so far as legal language is concerned, the "cause"
of a disease would depend on how, at any given time, it could be
most easily controlled. From this point of view, in the nineteenth
" See note 49 supra.
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century it would have been appropriate to speak of the "cause" of
tuberculosis as the absence of sun and the presence of bad living
conditions. Other possible factors, that were both but for causes and
causally linked, were not subject to human control, current or even
hypothetical. With the identification of the Koch bacillus all that
changed. At first potentially, and subsequently in practice, efforts
directed at this causally linked element seemed most likely to con-
trol the disease. It was unimportant that both living conditions and
genetic predisposition also mattered. What use would it be to speak
of these elements as causes when living conditions were so hard to
modify in comparison to controlling the bacillus and when genetic
predisposition was totally outside human control? Yet these two
factors remained causally linked to tuberculosis. More recently, the
prospect of genetic engineering has again changed the causal lan-
guage appropriate to this disease. Now one can, in a meaningful
way, speak of genetic. predisposition as a "cause" of tuberculosis.
The objective, with respect to tuberculosis, is easier to define
than are most legal objectives or goals. Causal language in law must
respond to the fact that at times the object sought may differ while
the factors subject to control remain the same. For example, courts
have been able to hold two faulty, independent hunters both liable
in cases like Summers v. Tice,5" even though only one of their shots
hit the victim and even though a showing of but for cause was
supposedly a prerequisite for liability. They would not as readily
have found two equally faulty independent rapists to be the fathers
of an illegitimate child-even though the causal evidence as to the
wrongdoing was precisely the same as in Summers v. Tice and even
though the victim was equally innocent. Rightly or wrongly, the
effects (and hence the function) of paternity actions are conceived
to be very different from those of money damage claims for injuries.
What is "cause" for one need not be "cause" for the other.
If we recognize that in law the term "cause" is used in different
guises but always to identify those pressure points that are most
amenable to the social goals we wish to accomplish, the apparent
paradox disappears. Where goals differ, so does the practical defini-
tion of causation. Some aspects of causation (like proximate cause)
show this functional basis on the surface. Others, like causal linkage
and but for relationship, often seem to be almost absolute, goal-
neutral requirements. But they appear that way simply because
they are being employed in contexts where, by and large, the appro-
11 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
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priate goals require them to be established almost universally. How-
ever, the willingness of courts to ignore not only but for causes in
cases like Summers v. Tice, but even causal linkage where extreme
spreading differences seem involved indicates, I suggest, that in the
law "cause in fact" (as it was once called), like proximate cause, is
in the end a functional concept designed to achieve human goals.
If causal concepts can be used flexibly to identify the pressure
points most amenable to our social goals, then use of such concepts
has great advantages over explicit identification and separation of
the goals. Terms with an historical, common law gloss permit us to
consider goals (like spreading) that we do not want to spell out or
too obviously assign to judicial institutions. Because, like all moral
terms, causal terms have come to have meanings of their own that
cannot be changed as a result of one person's analysis, they enable
us to resist political pressures that, would, if a more "goal con-
scious," antiseptic language were employed, result in a mixture of
goals thought to be less desirable. Finally, and probably most im-
portantly, they enable the introduction of goals we have not been
able to spell out or to analyze, but which nonetheless, together with
analyzed goals, form part of that set of relationships we call "jus-
tice."
If, on the other hand, causal concepts came to be too rigidly
defined and applied, they would no longer adequately serve the
goals we can analyze nor would they permit the introduction of the
goals we cannot affirm too openly or have not been able to analyze
at all. Furthermore, such rigidity would mean that the ability to
respond to changing goals and mixtures of goals, both analyzed and
implicit, which characterizes common law adjudication and con-
cepts, would be lost. No longer could new needs be introduced and
old ones dropped without tearing the seamless web. This rigidity has
not characterized the way in which cause has traditionally been
used in torts, nor is it the way it is being used now in the difficult
transition from fault to non-fault systems. As in the past, causal
concepts seem to be responding to changes in appropriate pressure
points, yet doing so without breaking with the past or with any not
clearly understood goals the past contains.
There is, of course, a danger here. Flexible concepts and "unan-
alyzed goals" can hide what is really at stake, who wins and who
loses and why. They may retain the best of a not fully understood
past, but they may also serve, plain and simple, to exploit. Clear
"radical reform" language eliminates those results that have simply
evolved-both useful and exploitative ones. Causal language tends
to preserve, for a while, such goals and hence some results that
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cannot be easily justified. It is no accident that some commentators
will, therefore, be totally impatient with causal concepts that facili-
tate the retention of unclear goals, while others will find iconoclastic
any examination of those concepts that will make them more
amenable to goal-oriented analysis.
I am optimistic about our ability to use concepts, like cause, to
promote analyzed goals, and, like John Stuart Mill, I am skeptical
of our ability to analyze all our goals59 and, in addition, to acknowl-
edge all that we can analyze. Thus, I am inclined to believe that the
requirement of causation in all three of its parts (causal link, but
for and proximity) will survive in many areas of non-fault liability
rather than be replaced by direct appeals to those clearly identified
goals which, by and large, those requirements seem to serve. Just
because it is flexible and functional, yet responsive to echoes from
the past, causal language will survive-that is what will make it as
useful in a non-fault world as it was in a fault-based world. Only if
it comes to be viewed as "absolute" or as representing inherent
"natural" relationships which the law cannot touch, whatever
human needs may require, will it outlive its usefulness and be re-
placed with other concepts in the law.
59 J.S. MILL, Essay on Bentham, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 20 (M. Cohen
ed. 1961).
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